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Abstract—With the recent developments in artificial intelli-
gence and machine learning, anomalies in network traffic can
be detected using machine learning approaches. Before the rise
of machine learning,network anomalies which could imply an
attack, were detected using well-crafted rules. An attacker who
has knowledge in the field of cyber-defence, could make educated
guesses to sometimes accurately predict which particular features
of network traffic data the cyber-defence mechanism is looking
at. With this information, the attacker can circumvent a rule-
based cyber-defense system. However, after the advancements
of machine learning for network anomaly, it is not easy for a
human to understand how to bypass a cyber-defence system.
Recently, adversarial attacks have become increasingly common
to defeat machine learning algorithms. In this paper, we show
that even if we build a classifier and train it with adversarial
examples for network data, we can use adversarial attacks
and successfully break the system. We propose a Generative
Adversarial Network(GAN)based algorithm to generate data
to train an efficient neural network based classifier, and we
subsequently break the system using adversarial attacks.
Index Terms—adversarial attacks, network intrusion, GANs
I. INTRODUCTION
Network intrusions have resulted in large-scale damages
in major organizations over a significant period of time.
Cisomag [15], in their report, states that a survey taken by
5400 organizations in US and Europe says that 61% of the
companies have faced a cyber-intrusions. The surge in the
number of attacks has forced the financial losses endured by
organizations due to cyber-attacks, to rise five fold. In 2017, an
attack on the US Electricity Grid was performed using multi-
stage intrusion by threat actors. [16]. This led the attackers
to gain access to the control switches with the help of which
they could have disrupted the power-flow of the entire nation.
As network intrusions have become common, the intrusion
detection systems have also evolved. They are increasingly
using Machine Learning based approaches to detect attacks.
A report by BDTechtalks [21] describes how email phishing
defence systems are finding it difficult to prevent malicious
emails from being communicated, and are having to rely on
AI. Attackers of this kind are increasingly using ‘Distributed
Spam Distraction’ and ‘polymorphic attacks’. This is making
the job of human operators very difficult as ‘spam distraction’
This work supported in part by a gift from IBM Research
is stressing out the defense systems, and ‘polymorphic attacks’
are being used to ‘cloak the identity’ of the malwares. AI
solutions are dealing with these problems more effectively than
human crafted rules. Security Intelligence [4] states multiple
reasons why AI might be paramount for cybersecurity. One
of the main reasons being, malware is becoming increasingly
complex. This is making the job of cybersecurity engineers
increasingly difficult, to create rules which would help identify
an attack. Another reason why AI will become important,
is that effective reporting of cyber-incidents has resulted in
a large quantity of data which could be used to train AI
algorithms. For example, MIT Lincoln Labs has been releasing
Intrusion-Detection datasets since 1998. [17]
With AI being used in cyber-defense systems, it is also
being increasingly used for offense. There are reports about
how attackers have used GANs to mimic the voice of a
trusted person and dupe people. [3]. This, along with other
similar attacks, have lead security engineers to give adversarial
attacks increased attention. Israel’s cyber-chief, at cybertech
conference, stated that adversarial AI has attempted to hack
automotives to make them ‘behave in a manner contrary to
their programming’. [20].
In this paper, we show that adversarial attacks can be used
to defeat machine learning based intrusion detection systems.
Specifically, we describe how a classifier yielding very good
performance in detecting a network intrusion alert, fails to
do so when faced with adversarial attacks.We focus on a
dataset of a network intrusion alert system. [1] The dataset
has features related to a cyber-event. The first stage of our
experiment involves building a robust neural network classifier
with the help of GANs [9]. GANs involve two neural networks
competing against each other, where one, the generator, is
trying to fool the other, the discriminator, with generated
adversarial examples. The discriminator, in turn, aims to not
get fooled by the generated adversarial examples. We use
GANs to generate adversarial examples during the training
phase, hoping to make the classifier aware of those adversarial
examples. GANs also help us in terms of dealing with the class
imbalance problem, [5] which is very common for training a
dataset of network intrusion alerts, thereby increasing classi-
fication scores for both the classes. In the second part of our
experiment we describe how we can use ‘Fast Gradient Sign
Method’ [10] to perform adversarial attacks on a classifier
with high accuracy. This helps in masquerading the cyber-
event samples by perturbing the data slightly, so that to the
neural network based classifier it seems that the event is a
‘non-attack’ sample, when in reality it is an ‘attack’ sample.
The key contributions of our research are that this paper states
that using GANs we can create classifiers which yield very
high scores when used to detect network intrusion. The other
contribution of this paper, is that we show that even such a
classifier is vulnerable to carefully crafted adversarial attacks.
We organize the paper as follows. Section II talks about the
works of other researchers in this domain. Section III talks
about the architecture of our experiment, the intuition, and the
mathematical foundation of the system. Section IV discusses
our findings from this experiment. Section V talks about the
scope of future extensions of this research.
II. RELATED WORK
In the recent times network attacks have become a major
challenge in the field of security. A lot of effort is being put
by researchers to mitigate network based attacks. One such
solution is the intrusion detection system (IDS) which alerts
the user whenever an abnormal event happens. The IDS is said
to be more robust and secure if it detects the attack quickly
and also learns new attacks. There are two ways of detecting
attacks such as rule-based detection and the other is machine
learning methods. The rule-based detection basically identifies
known type of attacks. The most commercially used IDS is
Snort [8] which detects an attack based on content matching
the rules from the file that contains characteristics of each
type of an attack. The main drawback for this method is that
it cannot identify new types of attacks.
In order to overcome this drawback machine learning
methods are widely being used for identifying unknown type
of attacks. Lee and Stoflo [14] published a framework to
collect features for network intrusion detection, which could
be used by machine learning algorithms. The machine learning
methods that are used for attack detection can be catego-
rized as supervised learning and unsupervised learning. The
supervised learning algorithm collects the data from network
and classifies them as an abnormal event or normal event
based on the behavior. There are various types of supervised
learning algorithms such as Nave Bayes [18], Random Forest
[24],Support Vector Machine (SVM) [12], Decision Tree, etc
that are used for attack detection. A performance evaluation is
done for the above classification algorithms by Belouch et al.
[2] to compare the accuracy for detection, prediction time and
it is observed that Random Forest showed better performance
in terms of accuracy. The only drawback in supervised learning
algorithm is that they require labelled data for training the
algorithm. In order to overcome this issue we use unsupervised
methods for detecting the anomalies in the network.
The traditional unsupervised learning methods draw infer-
ences from the unlabeled data for training the algorithm. Most
of the unsupervised methods are based on clustering and
outliers detection. In clustering the most popular approach in
unsupervised learning is K-means where the data is divided
into clusters based on certain similarities. Here k is defined
as number of clusters. In the paper [13] the authors used the
K-means approach to detect the abnormal behaviour from the
KDD99 dataset based on Euclidean distance in order to control
fraud in the network traffic. For the outlier detection the most
commonly used approach to leverage anomaly detection is
Principal Component Analysis(PCA) [19]. This is a multivari-
ate method where dimensionality reduction is done to lower
the dimensional space while preserving the information from
the data.
The other set of unsupervised learning methods that gained
lot of popularity for their performance are deep-learning based
as they require only raw data for training. For example,
Restricted Boltzmann machine [6] was used as an intrusion de-
tection system in smart cities to have better accuracy results in
attack detection by optimizing the hyperparameters. Similarily,
AutoEncoders [11] is another popular deep learning method
being used since it provides better classification results when
compared to the traditional deep learning methods.
As applications of AI have become popular, research has
also been done on how AI applications can be susceptible
to adversarial attacks. Xu et. al [23] have discussed in their
paper, the adversarial attacks that can affect neural network
based classifiers in the domain of images and graphs. In the
domain of images, significant work has been done related
to adversarial attacks as can be exemplified by Eykholt et.
al [7]. Research on adversarial attacks has also been done
for sequence to sequence models. He and Glass state in
their paper, [22] that they have made a model that calculates
input sequences that will generate incredible text sequences.
However, images are different from network intrusion data.
For instance, an image has pixels, each of them is equally
important, and any of them can be changed to a certain extent
without significant change occurring to the appearance of the
entire image. However, a cyber-event data has specific features,
some of them may be sensitive, and changing them even
slightly may make the change detectable.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section we describe the neural model we use to
distinguish between an actual attack and a non-attack scenario.
We then describe our findings related to how difficult or
easy it is for an attacker to break the machine learning
system using simple adversarial attacks. Figure 1 describes
the high-level architecture of our experimental setup. We first
train a classifier using GAN, which distinguishes between
‘attack’ and a ‘non-attack’. Then, we using ‘Fast Sign Gradient
Method’ [10] to effectively perturb the ‘attack’ samples so that
the classifier trained in the previous step, is forced to classify
them as ‘non-attack’.
A. Dataset Description and Pre-processing
We have used the data from the IEEE BigData 2019
Cup:Suspicious Network Event Recognition challenge. [1] The
data set given was built based on the data captured from
Fig. 1. Basic Architecture of our experiment
the network traffic events logged by the security systems and
was sponsored by Security on-Demand and QED Software.
Initially,the compressed data set comprised of training data,
test data and localized alerts present in the auxillary table. It
was restored based on the ‘alert id’ column that is common
for all three files by adding the columns of localized alert file
to the training and test data files when there is match based
on the identifiers present in the ‘alert id’ column. Some of
the important columns in the dataset are described here for
better understanding like the binary column named ‘notified’
is present only in the training data states whether the client
was notified about the alert or not. The severity of the event
is categorized and specified in the column ‘categoryname’.
Data preprocessing techniques like filling the missing values
in the 27 columns of the training data and 26 columns of
test data after being merged with localized alerts based on
‘alert id’ have been applied. Then normalization technique
such as rescaling is used to get the data into a common scale
as the columns in the data set initially had values in different
ranges.
B. Neural Network Classifier
The dataset, as described in Section III-A,has multiple
features which describe each sample point. The field ‘notified’
is a binary field where ‘0’ represents that the data point is a
non-attack, and ‘1’ represents an actual attack. There is also
an auxillary dataset, called ‘localized alerts’, as mentioned in
Section III-A which has a one-to-one mapping with the ‘alert-
id’ feature of the primitive dataset. The primary dataset has 6
fields, while the localized alert dataset has 20 features. Each
data point in the primary dataset, upon being merged with the
localized alert data corresponding with the ‘alert-id’ feature
of the datapoint, has 26 features. This can be represented as
a 26 dimensional vector, and neural networks can be used to
classify these vectors into ‘true attack’ and ‘non-attack’.
1) GAN to boost classifier performance: The merged
dataset had a class imbalance problem. The samples for ‘true
attack’ were significantly lower in number than the samples
for ‘non-attack’. The purpose of using GAN for this problem
is two-fold. As stated in [5], GANs can be effectively used
to solve a class imbalance problem inherent in the dataset.
Any neural network based classifier is susceptible to bias
introduced due to class imbalance. GANs are used to generate
training samples for the minority class, to make the classifier
robust. The minority class in this case, is the class of the true
attack samples. Given a basic feed-forward neural network, the
classifier would have been biased towards the majority class,
i.e, the class of ‘non-attack’ samples. During our experiments
we found out that the F-1 scores for attack samples were
significantly lower, which means given any network event,
the classifier would be more likely to classify it as an ‘non-
attack’ sample. The adversarial examples generated for the
attack class during training time, forces the neural network to
distinguish between attack and non-attack samples in a more
robust way.
2) GAN to help protect against Adversarial Attack: The
second reason why we use GAN to train our classifier, is
because it trains the neural network with adversarial examples.
In the later part of the paper, we want to break the AI classifier.
To make the claim that the attack is dangerous and effective,
we first have to make sure that the classifier has been trained
so that simple adversarial attacks do not make an impact.
When GANs generate adversarial examples, it tries to mimic
the distribution of the data, and tries to generate from that
distribution. Simple adversarial attacks forces a classifier to
make the mistake of mispredicting the output class of a sample
by exploiting class boundaries. With our training method,
generated samples help to relax those class boundaries so that
the adversarial attacks become difficult. For example in Figure
2, we can see that the class boundaries are rigid for those
samples and that particular feature. Hypothetically, if we were
to perform an adversarial attack based on this data, we could
have perturbed the value to 0.199 and it would not have been
classified in the attack class. The generated samples for the
attack class, helps to relax those boundaries, as we have some
samples for the attack class now, where the values do not lie
between 0.2 and 0.4.
C. Neural Network Architecture
The basic GAN has two components. One is a generator
and the other is a discriminator. We have described informally
the functionality and the purpose of the generator in Sections
III-B1 and III-B2. The other component, the discriminator,
helps learns the original distribution, and also learns how
to identify the generated samples as attacks. This makes the
discriminator a very well-informed classifier, as it sees the data
from the original distribution, and also the generated data. We
use this discriminator as our classifier, and we describe how
we subsequently break this classifier in the following sections.
In this section we describe formally the discriminator and the
Fig. 2. Example of data distribution for a particular feature where the class boundaries are well defined
generator. A conventional GAN has two neural networks, a
discriminator and a generator. The generator tries to generate
fake data, while the discriminator tries to model how to differ-
entiate between the real data and the fake data. In our case, the
generator generates samples mimicking the data distribution.
These samples are the adversaries which the discriminator
wants to classify as ‘attack’. The aim of the generator is
to generate ‘attack’ samples, which are the adversaries, such
that the discriminator confuses them to be ‘non-attack’ data
points. The aim of the discriminator is to classify the generated
adversaries as ‘attack’ samples. In conventional GAN, there
are two loss metrics.
• Generator loss: Generator loss is calculated only for the
generated data, as opposed to both real and generated
data for the discriminator loss. The generated data is
given the label 1, and the output of the discriminator
is calculated when the generated data is served as an
input. We calculate the cross-entropy loss between the
generated labels and the labels produced by the discrim-
inator with the generator data as input. In this case, the
generator loss is the loss encountered by the generator
when discriminator classifies the adversaries generated
by the generator as ‘attack’ samples. The following
equation says that we want to minimize the entropy
for the adversarial examples generated by the generator,
with respect to class ‘0’, which corresponds to the ‘non-
attack’ class. This forces the generator to optimize in
order to make sure that the discriminator gets confused
and classifies the ‘adversaries’ as ‘non-attack’ samples.
minGVG(D,G) =
minG(Eadversary∼padversary [log(D(G(adversary)))])
• Discriminator Loss: This loss is calculated from the
discriminator. It calculates how well the discriminator can
distinguish between the fake data and the real data. The
fake data or the generated data is given the label ‘1’,
and the real data is given the label ‘0’. We sample the
real data and the fake data, in batches, as part of the
training process and see the output of the discriminator.
We calculate cross-entropy loss between the labels as-
signed to the data and the predictions of the model. In
this case, the discriminator loss will be the usual cross
entropy loss encountered by the classifier, and also the
loss encountered by classifying the adversarial examples
as ‘non-attack’. The following equation says that we want
to minimize the entropy of the ‘non-attack’ samples with
respect to class ‘0’ or the ‘non-attack’ class. We also
want to minimize the entropy of the ‘attack’ samples and
the adversarial samples with respect to class ‘1’, or the
‘attack’ class. This makes sure that the discriminator gets
optimized in order to classify the ‘non-attack’ samples
as ‘non-attack’, ‘attack’ as ‘attack’, and ‘adversaries’ as
‘attack’ respectively.
minDVD(D,G) =
minD(Exnon−attack∼pnon−attack [log(D(xnon−attack)] +
Eattack∼pattack [log(1 − D(xattack))] +
Eadversary∼padversary [log(1−D(G(adversary)))])
We use the generator to learn the data distribution in order
to generate attack event samples.
D. Adversarial Attacks
Adversarial Attacks fool a neural network classifier by
making minuscule perturbations in the data samples in order to
fool a neural network. This can be achieved in multiple ways.
One of the ways this can be achieved is the ‘Fast Gradient Sign
Method’. [10] This method calculates the gradient of the loss
function, when changing the label of the output to a desired
label, with respect to the input data. This helps the attacker
to calculate which direction they should change the data, in
order to force the neural network to produce the desired result
as output. In this experiment, we calculate the gradient of the
desired output (‘non-attack’) with respect to a sample which
is drawn from the pool of ‘attack’ data.
δ = ǫ.sign(∇xattack loss(xattack, y = ‘non− attack)) (1)
xattack = xattack + δ (2)
In the equation 1, the ‘loss’ refers to the cross-entropy
loss of the trained neural network. The δ refers to the small
perturbations which we use to change the data from the
attack samples. If we disturb the input sample, with small
perturbations for a finite number of iterations, we can reach a
value for xattack which is numerically very close to the actual
xattack sample, but forces the neural network to produce an
output of ‘non-attack’.
The Fast Gradient Sign method [10] calculates the direction
of partial derivatives of the data sample, with respect to the
desired output. This results in a 26 dimensional variable,
where each dimension says the direction in which we have
to move in order to perturb the data effectively. We multiply
the direction vector with a very small number ǫ. This produces
the ‘perturbation vector’ which we add to the xattack sample.
We do this for a finite number of iterations and check the
output of the neural network, for this perturbed data. We also
want to make sure that the perturbations are not affecting
sensitive features. In Section IV, we will show how we have
conducted experiments where we perform adversarial attacks
without interfering with sensitive features.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND RESULTS
The GAN based classifier, has two neural networks. First
the generator and then the discriminator. The generator is a
4 layer neural network with ‘4’, ‘16’, ‘16’, and ‘26’ neurons
respectively. This generator results in a 26 dimensional vector
which is a candidate for a forged ‘attack’ sample. The dis-
criminator is a 5 layer neural network, with ‘26’, ‘16’, ‘16’,
‘2’, and ‘1’ neuron respectively. The discriminator produces a
binary output, where ‘0’ corresponds to a ‘non-attack’ and ‘1’
corresponds to an ‘attack’. The generator generates ‘attack’
samples and sends them to the discriminator hoping for the
discriminator to mispredict them into the ‘non-attack’ class.
The discriminator receives the generated samples, and also
data samples from the actual dataset, and tries to predict the
‘non-attack’ samples as ‘0’, and everything else as ‘1’. The
loss function, we use to calculate the discriminator loss and
the generator loss, is sigmoid cross-entropy.
As stated in Section III-A,the merged dataset has 6M
samples. We split the dataset into 12 folds of 500k samples,
and we calculated the scores for the ‘non-attack’ samples and
the ‘attack’ samples.
At each iteration, we generate 20 samples for the ‘attack’
class from the generator. We sample 30 data points from the
dataset to construct each batch. This brings the total number
of data points for each batch being sent to the discriminator
to 50. We sample in such a way, so that for each batch we
have equal number of ‘attack’ and ‘non-attack’ samples.
We run our experiments for the 500k samples, and then
on the entire dataset of 6M samples. We split each dataset
Classes Precision Recall F-1 Score
Non-Attack 97 98 98
Attack 89 91 90
TABLE I
PRECISION, RECALL, AND F-1 SCORE FOR OUR CLASSES AVERAGED
ACROSS THE SPLITS.
Classes Precision Recall F-1 Score
Non-Attack 98 96 97
Attack 85 92 88
TABLE II
PRECISION, RECALL, AND F-1 SCORE FOR OUR CLASSES FOR THE ENTIRE
DATASET.
into training and testing with a ratio of 0.3. This means we
have 350k samples for training, and 150k samples for test. We
report the scores precision, recall, and F-1 scores on the test set
for the experiment. In Table II, we can see the average scores
of the test-sets of our 500k samples after 50,000 iterations. The
‘Non-Attack’ scores signify the model’s performance while
detecting the samples from the test set, where the label is ‘0’.
The ‘Attack’ scores signify the model’s performance while
detecting the samples from the test set, where the label is ‘1’
and also the generated samples from the generator. In Table
I, we can see the performance of our model in the test set of
the entire dataset.
In the second part of our experiment, we perform the
adversarial attack as stated in the previous section. We perform
‘Fast-Sign Gradient Method’ attack on the data samples. We
sample 1000 data points from the dataset, making sure all
the 1000 data points correspond to the ‘attack’ label.The δ as
mentioned in Equation 2 is used to make small perturbations
to each data point. We update the data points for 500 iterations,
and then provide these changed values to the already trained
classifier. We measure our attack success based on the ratio
of the number of labels that have been changed, and the total
number of samples sent to face the attack. The value of the
ǫ stated in Equation 1 is taken as 0.00005. This means that
even after 500 iterations, the maximum change in a particular
feature can face after perturbations is 0.0025, which is small
considering our normalized features range from -1 to 1.
As discussed in Section III-D, we want to see how success-
ful the attack is, if we do not want to interfere with sensitive
components of the data. We calculate the partial derivatives
of the loss function with the attack label, with respect to
the input, as part of the process of the adversarial attack, as
stated in Equation 1. Each partial derivative results in a 26
dimensional vector, signifying the direction, as well as the
magnitude by which we have to move in order to reach a
value for the sample which would produce the desired output.
Although, in the ‘Fast-Sign Gradient Method’ [10] we are only
interested in the direction or the ‘sign’ of the gradients, we
can also use the magnitude to calculate which features are
significant for the adversarial attack to take place. We tabulate
the values independently, and we mask the most significant
Number of candidate features Attack Success Rate
All present 96
Significant feature not used 72
Top 2 features not used 60
Top 3 features not used 41
TABLE III
ADVERSARIAL ATTACK PERFORMANCE BASED ON THE NUMBER OF
FEATURES USED
features for the adversarial attack and re-calculate the attack
success rates. The intuition behind this exercise is that if as a
defence mechanism, we pay attention to the most significant
features, we want to know if it is still possible to successfully
attack the neural network based classifier with the help of the
lesser significant features. We stop the δ updates, for those
features and perform the updates for the rest of the features
and calculate the attack success scores in Table III. We can
see, although the attack success rates drop significantly it is
still possible to cause adversarial attacks on the remaining
features with at least 41% success rate. This number is still
high, considering that its happening in a network intrusion
detection system, where we want minimum room for error.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have discussed how we can train a neural
network based classifier for a network intrusion detection
system, and can successfully break it using ‘Fast-Sign Gradient
Method’. We show that adversarial attacks can cause harm
even for network intrusion detection system. As opposed to
domains such as computer vision where changing a few pixels,
even drastically, may not appear to visually change the image,
changing any dimension of the input vector may not be as easy
in network intrusion detection systems. We show how even by
not using sensitive features we are able to successfully perform
adversarial attacks on the classifier. We have built a classifier
and trained it with adversarial examples, to make it robust.
But this particular method of adversarial attack is successful
against breaking a neural network which has seen adversarial
examples during training phase. In future, we would like to
build defence mechanisms against these kind of attacks for
network intrusion.
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